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The Hourglass and Due Process:
The Propriety of Time Limits
on Civil Trials
By JOHN E. RUMEL*
Introduction
TOWARD THE END of the American film classic "The Wizard of
Oz," the Wicked Witch of the West decrees that the ancient time-
keeper, the hourglass, I will determine the heroine Dorothy's fate. As the
sand trickles down, the tension builds to an excruciating level until Doro-
thy's rescuers finally arrive. In frustration, the Wicked Witch shatters
the hourglass.
Rarely used in the past,2 the hourglass has recently found its way
into the courtroom. 3 Trial judges, exercising their role as case managers,
skeptical about attorneys' willingness to streamline the presentation of
evidence, and concerned that burgeoning dockets will undermine the
public's right of access to the courts, have increasingly placed time limits
on the evidentiary portion of civil trials.4 Thus, after waiting years to get
* Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law. J.D.,
1981, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.A., 1977, University of Califor-
nia, Santa Cruz.
The author was a partner in a San Francisco law firm and appeared before Judge Brown
only once. He would like to thank Professor Richard P. Berg for reviewing and making help-
ful suggestions on a prior draft of this Article, and Santa Clara University law student T.
Michelle Laird for providing valuable research assistance.
1. An hourglass measures time by the regular flow of sand through a small hole at the
mid-point of two connected bulbs of glass. Its use dates to the early 14th century. Histori-
cally, the hourglass was used at sea to navigate and to time the ship's watch. On land, the
hourglass has been used for such diverse purposes as timing sermons and boiling eggs. 14
ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 458 (1981). It was first used as a metaphor for time limits on
trials in McKnight v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 104, 114 (7th Cir. 1990).
2. See Report to the President and Attorney General of the National Commission for
the Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures, 80 F.R.D. 509, 536 (1979) [hereinafter "Anti-
trust Commission Report"]; see also Roger W. Kirst, Finding a Role for the Civil Jury in
Modern Litigation, 69 JUDICATURE 333, 337 (1986).
3. Kirst, supra note 2; Mark Cursi, Tick, Tick, Tick Tick .. , S.F. REC., Apr. 4, 1991,
at 1.
4. See infra section II. This Article will limit its analysis to time limits on the eviden-
tiary portion of civil, primarily federal, trials, and will refer to that practice as "trial time
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to trial, litigants and counsel may now face limited time to present their
case.
Initially met with skepticism by some judges and trial lawyers, 5 trial
time limits have been embraced by the bench, bar, and many commenta-
tors.6 Appellate courts have upheld them in virtually every case,7 and
even appellate courts that disdain the practice have affirmed lower court
judgments rendered in time-limited trials.8
Unlike the Wicked Witch, this Article does not intend to shatter the
hourglass. It will, however, argue that trial time limits must comport
with due process standards, including both "private" and "public" as-
pects of the due process clause.9
Section I of this Article discusses a trial judge's statutory and inher-
ent authority to impose time limits on civil trials.1° Section II examines
the scant case law analyzing the propriety of trial time limits and focuses
on two complementary themes."1 One theme chronicles the near-unani-
mous judicial belief that limiting trial time benefits all parties interested
in or affected by litigation. These parties include party litigants, other
litigants awaiting trial before the same court, juries, and the public. 12
The second theme identifies the existent, but much less prevalent, judicial
criticism of trial time limits. This criticism is rooted in the due process
clause.' 3 Section III outlines the contours of the due process limitation
and focuses on safeguarding the rights of the litigant-the "private" due
limits." "time limits on trials," or the like. Although some of the points made in the Article
may be applicable by analogy, it will not address time limits on the evidentiary portion of
criminal trials, which raises Sixth Amendment issues. See United States v. Freel, 681 F. Supp.
766, 769 (M.D. Fla. 1988), aff'd, 868 F.2d 1274 (11th Cir. 1990). Likewise, the Article will
not address the propriety of other related time limits, such as time limits on the length of
opening and closing arguments, see Michael R. Flaherty, Annotation, Propriety of Trial Court
Order Limiting Time for Opening or Closing Argument in Criminal Cases-State Cases, 71
A.L.R. 4th 200 (1989), limits on the length of briefs and argument in both trial and appellate
courts, see generally Pierre N. Leval, From the Bench: Westmoreland v. CBS, 12 LITIG. 7
(Fall 1985), and limits on the length of jury voir dire, see, e.g., Boyd v. State, 811 S.W.2d 105
(1991).
5. See Frederick B. Lacey, Proposed Techniques for Streamlining Trial of Complex Anti-
trust Cases: Pro and Con, 48 ANTITRUST L.J. 487, 492 (1978-79); Cursi, supra note 3, at 10.
6. See, e.g., Lacey, supra note 5, at 492; Cursi, supra note 3, at 10; Leval, supra note 4, at
8; Kirst, supra note 2, at 337; Antitrust Commission Report, supra note 2, at 535-36; William
W Schwarzer, Reforming Jury Trials, 1990 U. CHL LEGAL F. 119, 123.
7. See infra section II.
8. See infra section II.B.
9. See infra section III.
10. See infra section I.
11. See infra section II.
12. See infra section II.A.
13. See infra section II.B.
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process limitation-and maintaining public confidence in our civil justice
system-the "public" due process constraint. 14 Finally, Section IV sug-
gests several factors that trial judges and appellate courts should use in
setting trial time limits and determining whether such time limits satisfy
due process requirements. 1 5
I. Authority for Imposing Trial Time Limits
Like the constitutional right to privacy, 16 a trial court's authority to
impose trial time limits emanates from the penumbra of several statutory
provisions.17 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1 provides that the rules of
procedure must be construed to secure the "just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action."' 8 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16
further authorizes federal judges to issue pretrial orders limiting proof. '9
Rule 16 is especially relevant because, as discussed below, trial time lim-
its are most appropriate when imposed before trial.20
Courts and commentators have relied on the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence to limit the length of trials. Specifically, courts have cited Rules
403 and 611 as support for trial time limits. 21 Under Rule 403, "evidence
may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury,
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presenta-
tion of cumulative evidence."'22 Rule 61 l(a) states that "[t]he court shall
exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating wit-
nesses and presenting evidence so as to ... make the interrogation and
presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, [and] ... avoid
needless consumption of time .... ,,23
14. See infra section III.
15. See infra section IV.
16. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) where Justice Douglas found a
right to privacy emanating from the penumbra of several constitutional provisions.
17. Judge Leval, discussing his decision to impose trial time limits in Westmoreland v.
CBS, No. 82 Civ. 7913 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), indicated that he knew of no contrary authority.
Leval, supra note 4, at 8.
18. FED. R. Civ. P. 1, quoted in SCM Corp. v. Xerox, 77 F.R.D. 10, 13 (D. Conn. 1977);
United States v. Reaves, 636 F. Supp. 1575, 1578 & n.10 (E.D. Ky. 1986).
19. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(4) provides in pertinent part that "[t]he participants at any
[pretrial] conference under this rule may consider and take action with respect to ... the
avoidance of unnecessary proof and of cumulative evidence." See also JAMES W. MOORE ET
AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 21.64 at 113-14 (1986) (Manual for Complex Litigation);
Schwarzer, supra note 6, at 123.
20. See infra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 32-49, 66-74 and accompanying text.
22. FED. R. EVID. 403.
23. FED. R. EviD. 61 l(a). Courts have stretched the law when applying Federal Rules of
Winter 1992]
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Less frequently, courts have relied on Rule 102 to place time limits
on trials.24 Rule 102 requires that the Federal Rules of Evidence "shall
be construed to secure fairness in administration [and] elimination of un-
justifiable expense and delay,.., to the end that the truth may be ascer-
tained and proceedings justly determined. ' 25 Some courts have held that
these Rules of Evidence codify the judiciary's inherent power to control
the disposition of cases on their dockets.26 Other courts regard them as a
complement to that power.27 Whatever the source, the Supreme Court
has made clear that trial judges have broad discretion to control the pres-
entation of evidence:
The trial judge must meet situations as they arise and to do this must
have broad power to cope with the complexities and contingencies in-
herent in the adversary process. To this end, he may determine gener-
ally the order in which parties will adduce proof; his determination
will be reviewed only for abuse of discretion. Within limits, the judge
may control the scope of rebuttal testimony, may refuse to allow cu-
mulative, repetitive or irrelevant testimony, and may control the scope
of examination of witnesses. If truth and fairness are not to be sacri-
ficed, the judge must exert substantial control over the proceedings.28
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Evidence, and the inher-
ent power identified by the Supreme Court, provide ample authority for
trial time limits. These authorities, however, by referring to the "ascer-
tainment of truth," contain within them the due process limitation that
has not yet been sufficiently defined or nurtured by the courts and com-
mentators. Due process requires that trial judges not curtail the presen-
tation of evidence so as to impede the ascertainment of truth-to the
Evidence 403 and 611 to support trial time limits. Judge Newman noted in one of the first
reported decisions on trial time limits that Rule 403
normally contemplates that the time-consuming nature of evidence will be deter-
mined as to each particular item of evidence offered. However, in a protracted case
..., the purpose of the rule can best be achieved by considering time in the aggregate
and leaving to counsel the initial responsibility for making individualized selections
as to the relative degree of probative value from the mass of evidence available.
SCM Corp. v. Xerox, 77 F.R.D. 10, 13 (D. Conn. 1977). In addition, Rule 611(a) has been
more commonly used as authority for taking witnesses out of order or allowing narrative testi-
mony at particular junctures during trial. See generally JOHN B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET
A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, § 611[01], at 611-19 - 611-21, 611-30 (1991).
24. See infra note 71.
25. FED. R. EvID. 102.
26. See, e.g., United States v. Reaves, 636 F. Supp. 1575, 1578 (E.D. Ky. 1986).
27. Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 629-32 (1962).
28. Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 86-87 (1976) (citations omitted), quoted in Sec-
retary of Labor v. DeSisto, 929 F.2d 789, 794 (1st Cir. 1991); see also Schwarzer, supra note 6,
at 124; Chambers v. NASCO Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2123, 2132-36 (1991) (discussing trial court's
inherent power to assess attorneys' fees as a sanction for bad faith litigation conduct).
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detriment of the litigants and public alike.29 Thus, the same authorities
that grant trial judges broad discretion to impose trial time limits also
mandate circumspection in their use.
I. The Cases
Trial judges have only recently exercised their authority to impose
time limits on trials.30 The reported decisions are few and have usually
involved complex cases, often antitrust matters.31 The developing case
law on judicially-imposed time limits has travelled just short of the full
circle of judicial reasoning and emotions: from frustration with counsel
resulting in their initial adoption; to unbridled enthusiasm for a new pro-
cedural tool; to the first hint of caution and restraint predicated on a
vaguely-defined sense of fairness. To complete the circle, courts must
develop a fuller understanding of the due process rights implicated by
trial time limits, as well as principles governing and limiting their use.
A. Early Cases: Frustration Leads to Efficiency
SCM Corp. v. Xerox 32 was the first major reported federal decision
to impose trial time limits. In SCM, counsel for both sides initially esti-
mated that the trial of an antitrust action would take six to eight months
(three to four months for each side) and the court impanelled a jury
based on that expectation. 33 After fourteen weeks of trial, plaintiff
SCM's counsel had called only two principal witnesses, using the balance
29. See infra section III.
30. See supra notes 2-8 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 32-106 and accompanying text. Faced with a civil case that threatens
to tie up their docket for several months or longer, a trial judge will likely be more inclined to
impose trial time limits. However, the size and complexity of a case bears no necessary corre-
lation to the need for time limits. See Kirst, supra note 2, at 338. Indeed, the most vociferous
judicial proponent of trial time limits has lamented that attorneys turn small cases into big
ones. United States v. Reaves, 636 F. Supp. 1575, 1579 (E.D. Ky. 1986); see infra note 70 and
accompanying text. Ultimately, the size and complexity of a case relate not to whether time
limits should be imposed, but to the appropriate length of any limitation.
32. 77 F.R.D. 10 (D. Conn. 1977). For an early, perfunctory federal decision imposing
time limits, see Molever v. Levenson, 539 F.2d 996 (4th Cir. 1976). For state decisions impos-
ing time limits, see Hicks v. Kentucky, 805 S.W.2d 144, 151 (Ky. 1990), Varnum v. Varnum,
536 A.2d 1107, 1115 (Vt. 1990), and Brown v. Brown, 488 P.2d 689 (Ariz. 1971). Non-re-
ported federal cases where time limits have been imposed include Zenith Radio Corp. v. Mat-
sushita Electric Indus. Co., No. 74-2451 (E.D. Pa. filed Sept. 24, 1974), discussed in Lacey,
supra note 5, at 492, Westmoreland v. CBS, No. 82 Civ. 7913 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), discussed in
Leval, supra note 4, and Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football
League, No. 78-3523 (C.D. Cal. 1981), In re Apple Securities Lit., No. C 84-20148 (N.D. Cal.
1991), and City of San Jose v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis Inc., No. C 84-20601 (N.D.
Cal. 1991)--all discussed in Cursi, supra note 3, at 1, 10.
33. SCM Corp., 77 F.R.D. at 11.
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of the allotted time to introduce documents and present deposition ex-
tracts. 34 District Judge Newman repeatedly requested witness lists, but
counsel did not promptly comply. 3 5 Moreover, SCM's counsel ignored
the judge's repeated cautions to exercise "self-restraint" in presenting ev-
idence, and not to "save the best [evidence] for last."'3 6 Finally, when
SCM's counsel informed the court that plaintiff's case would take seven
months, rather than the four initially estimated, Judge Newman took ac-
tion.3 7 Relying on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1 and Federal Rule
of Evidence 403, Judge Newman ordered that SCM had six months to
present its case.38 The judge arrived at the time limit based
upon all of the circumstances, including the estimates originally given,
the estimates of additional time now claimed to be needed, the nature
of the evidence presented to date, the excessive extent of detail with
which such evidence has been presented, the absence of any signifi-
cantly new topics yet to be presented, and the unlikelihood that any
effort short of an overall time limit will prove to be effective.
39
The judge indicated, however, that he would consider extensions if the
time limits created hardship, but that SCM could only use additional
time to rebut Xerox's case.40
Judge Newman imposed the time limit due to his frustration with
SCM's counsel. The judge bemoaned counsel's lack of self-restraint and
noted that counsel failed to aid the court by presenting evidence selec-
tively.41 Sarcastically, he observed that "[a]n antitrust suit remains a
piece of litigation,... not a life's work.' '42 The judge further wrote that
"[i]t has never been supposed that a party has an absolute right to force
upon an unwilling tribunal an unending and superfluous mass of testi-
mony limited only by his own judgment and whim,"' 43 and "[t]he Court
may ... be forced to exclude where the evidence is not so much cumula-
34. Id. at 12..
35. Id. at 13.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 13, 15.
39. Id. at 15.
40. Id. at 15-16. Judge Newman's order did not impose time limits on defendant Xerox,
and his opinion did not address the issue. To satisfy due process requirements, Judge Newman
should have imposed a similar limitation on Xerox, preferably sooner rather than later,
although not necessarily one of the same length. See infra notes 134-38 and accompanying
text.
41. SCM Corp., 77 F.R.D. at 14 (citing United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,
93 F. Supp. 190, 191 (D. Mass. 1950) (Wyzanski, J.)).
42. Id.
43. Id. (quoting 6 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1907 (Chadbourne rev. 1976)).
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tive as overwhelming in quantity." 44 Drawing solace from Justice
Holmes, the judge observed that limiting the evidence was "a concession
to the shortness of life."
'45
Judge Newman's concerns for the jury also motivated him to impose
time limits. The judge noted that jurors, as involuntary participants in
the judicial process, should not be forced to serve much beyond the origi-
nal trial time estimates. 46 More importantly, the judge stated that the
time limits are necessary "to promote juror comprehension" and elimi-
nate "[the] profusion of data [that] threatens to impede their orderly and
fair decision-making. ' '47
Finally, Judge Newman suggested that time limits were necessary to
safeguard the overall administration of justice. Citing his heavy
caseload, a lack of fellow judges, and his obligation to other litigants,4 8
the judge noted that SCM's relatively private objective, a damage remedy
under the antitrust laws, "must be weighed ... in determining to what
extent the public functions of a public tribunal should be diverted by
continued litigation of this case."
'49
In another antitrust action, Juneau Square Corp. v. First Wisconsin
National Bank,50 the court also limited trial time. In so doing, the court
highlighted the administration of justice rationale and addressed what
amounted to a due process challenge to this fledgling form of case man-
agement. In Juneau Square, District Judge Warren allotted three
months for trial. Plaintiffs had thirty-four days and the Bank defendants
had twenty days to present their cases. 51 Hinting at a due process chal-
lenge, plaintiffs sought a new trial and argued that the time constraints
denied them an opportunity to fully and fairly present their claims.52
Specifically, they argued that their trial time was too short and that the
Bank defendants' extensive voir dire and cross-examination of plaintiffs'
witnesses, and the requirement that plaintiffs' witnesses read irrelevant
portions of deposition testimony, further shortened their trial time.
5 3
44. Id. (quoting JACK B. WEINSTEIN, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE §§ 403[06], 403[95],
403[101] (1991)).
45. Id. (quoting Reeve v. Dennett, 11 N.E. 938, 944 (1887) (Holmes, J.)).
46. Id. at 14-15.
47. Id. at 15; Schwarzer, supra note 6, at 3.
48. SCM Corp., 77 F.R.D. at 14.
49. Id. SCM Corp. was cited as authority for trial time limits in two recent bankruptcy
cases. In re City of Bridgeport, 128 B.R. 589, 590-92 (Bank. D. Conn. 1991); In re Galaxy
Assocs., 118 B.R. 8, 10 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1990).
50. 475 F. Supp. 451 (E.D. Wis. 1979).
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Judge Warren rejected plaintiffs' arguments and indicated that he
had established the time limit based on the complexity of the case and the
vast quantity of evidence involved.5 4 The judge further noted that other
litigation pending before him necessitated the time limitation:
Considering the crowded dockets of the courts, the [c]ourt has a re-
sponsibility to exercise reasonable control over the amount of trial time
allotted to litigants. Affording parties unlimited amounts of trial time
prejudices other litigants before the [clourt who must then wait extra
months before their cases come to trial. These factors must also be
considered and were considered by the [c]ourt.
55
In the best known appellate decision on the subject, the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit squarely addressed a due process chal-
lenge to trial time limits in MCI Communications v. American Telephone
& Telegraph.56 In yet another antitrust action, plaintiff MCI estimated
that it would take twenty-six days to present its case-in-chief.57 Defend-
ant AT&T originally estimated that the action would take eighteen
months, but later reduced that figure to eight or nine months. 58 District
Judge Grady agreed with MCI's estimate and imposed a twenty-six day
time limit on each side's case-in-chief, but did not impose a time limit on
rebuttal or surrebuttal. 59 On appeal, AT&T argued that this time limit
was arbitrary and denied due process.6°
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit disagreed. The Sev-
enth Circuit did not discuss the judicial administration rationale for im-
posing time limits, but stressed the district judge's right to limit
cumulative evidence. 61 For the first time, the court stated that imposing
time limits to exclude cumulative evidence was not, per se, an abuse of
discretion, provided the court did not exclude witnesses based merely on
numbers. 62 The court noted that Judge Grady had reviewed the parties'
witness lists, summaries of their proposed testimony, and precise time
estimates for trial before establishing the time limit.63 The court further
emphasized that the time limits were flexible and, although Judge Grady
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983). The district court's
opinion is reported at MCI Communications v. American Tel. & Tel., 85 F.R.D. 28 (N.D. Ill.
1979).
57. MCI Communications, 708 F.2d at 1170.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1170-71 (citing MCI Communications, 85 F.R.D. at 32).
60. MCI Communications, 708 F.2d at 1171.
61. Id.
62. Id.; Padovani v. Bruchhausen, 293 F.2d 546, 550 (2d Cir. 1961) (error to limit wit-
nesses based on mere numbers).
63. MCI Communications, 708 F.2d at 1170.
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denied AT&T's request for an extension, he had not been "prepared to
adhere strictly to [his] preliminary time limits without regard to possible
prejudice to either party."6' The Seventh Circuit upheld these time lim-
its against the due process challenge because AT&T had sufficient time
for "an efficient, yet effective presentation of [its] defense. ' 65
Having received appellate approval in MCI, trial time limits re-
ceived their most vitriolic (some might say caustic) justification in United
States v. Reaves,66 a criminal tax fraud action. In Reaves, District Judge
Bertelsman imposed a ninety-six hour, i.e., sixteen trial days, time limit
on all parties.67 More importantly, in dicta, Judge Bertelsman gave a
testimonial for trial time limits and a diatribe directed at trial lawyers.
68
If his fellow judges had justified time limits based on a desire to exclude
cumulative evidence, Judge Bertelsman made the point with a broadside:
It would seem that early in the career of every trial lawyer, he or she
has lost a case by leaving something out, and thereupon resolved never
again to omit even the most inconsequential item of possible evidence
from any future trial. Thereafter, in an excess of caution the attorney
tends to overtry his case by presenting vast quantities of cumulative or
marginally relevant evidence. In civil cases, economics place some nat-
ural limits on such zeal. The fact that the attorney's fee may not be
commensurate with the time required to present the case thrice over
imposes some restraint. In a criminal case, however, the prosecution,
at least in the federal system, seems not to be subject to such fiscal
constraints, and the attorney's enthusiasm for tautology is virtually
unchecked. 69
64. Id. at 1172. The Seventh Circuit noted as being "of interest, but not determinative,"
AT&T's counsel's remark to Judge Grady that he was "very pleased with the amount of time
we have been given" and that he was not "cutting down [on the presentation of the defense]
because you are leaning on us." Id. at 1172 n.133. Regarding the possibility of waiving the
objection to overly restrictive time limits, see infra note 154.
65. MCI Communications, 708 F.2d at 1172. The court of appeals relied on the National
Committee for Review of Antitrust Law Procedures report that recommended imposing time
limits in complex antitrust litigation:
Time limits for length of trial... have been rarely used. The power of judges to cut
off cumulative, redundant presentations of proof may provide authority for the use of
overall limits on trial presentations. As long as the limitations established are realis-
tic and fair, and the judge prevents delaying tactics by hostile witnesses, we believe
that trial time limits would also be an appropriate means of expediting litigation.
Id. at 1171-72 n.132 (quoting Antitrust Commission Report, supra note 2, at 535-36 (footnote
omitted)).
66. 636 F. Supp. 1575 (E.D. Ky 1986).
67. Id. at 1581.
68. Although issued to justify a Scheduling Order, Judge Bertelsman issued his opinion
almost eight months after the order and only after the case had ended in a mistrial caused by
the misconduct of a witness. Id. at 1577.
69. Id. at 1576. Judge Bertelsman had previously experienced what he felt was a lack of
cooperation from the government and voiced his dissatisfaction with its conduct in unmistaka-
Winter 19921 TRIAL TIME LIMIT'S
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Further sounding the need for trial time limits and pointing to attorneys'
lack of self-restraint, Judge Bertelsman continued his ad hominem:
A court cannot rely on the attorneys to keep expenditures of time in
trying a case within reasonable bounds. The perspectives of the court
and the attorneys in trying a case differ markedly. A judge wants to
reach a just result in the case and to do so expeditiously and economi-
cally. An attorney's primary concern is to WIN the case. If he be-
lieves he can win that case by proliferating the evidence of the
favorable, but relatively uncontested matters so that the weaker as-
pects of the case will be camouflaged, it is asking too much of our
fallen nature to expect him to do otherwise.
Somehow the unfortunate trend has arisen among attorneys to
make almost every case a BIG CASE. There is a tendency to want to
present the evidence not once, but many times over, and to adduce
needlessly cumulative evidence not only on the controverted issues but
also on those which are all but uncontested. Advocates tend to con-
fuse quantity of evidence with probative quality. Nothing lulls an at-
torney to the passage of time like the sound of his or her own voice.
Few attorneys can tell you what time it is without describing how the
clock was made.
70
After identifying the source of the problem, Judge Bertelsman com-
piled judicial and scholarly support and statutory and inherent authority
for imposing trial time limits. 71 Significantly, Judge Bertelsman repeat-
edly invoked the public's interest in the speedy resolution of civil disputes
and access to the courts as major factors justifying trial time limits:
Modern courts recognize that the court's time is a "public commodity
which should not be squandered." There is an unnamed party in every
lawsuit-the public. Public resources are squandered if judicial pro-
ceedings are allowed to proliferate beyond reasonable bounds. The
public's right to a "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action" . . is infringed, if a court allows a case ... to preempt
more than a reasonable share of the court's time.
Recent trends in litigation have brought courts to the realization
that their dockets do not belong to the attorneys or litigants, nor even
to the courts themselves, but to the public....
ble terms. See United States v. Algie, 503 F. Supp. 783 (E.D. Ky. 1980), rev'd on other
grounds, 667 F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1982).
70. Reaves, 636 F. Supp. at 1578-79.
71. For case authority, Judge Bertelsman relied on SCM Corp. v. Xerox, 77 F.R.D. 10
(D. Conn. 1977), MCI Communications v. American Tel. & Tel., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir.
1982), cert denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983), and Juneau Square Corp. v. First Wisconsin Nat'l
Bank, 475 F. Supp. 451 (E.D. Wis. 1979). Id. at 1577 n.6. For scholarly support, the judge
cited to Leval, supra note 4, and Kirst, supra note 2. Id. at 1577-78 nn. 2, 5 & 8. For statutory
authority, the judge relied on Federal Rules of Evidence 102, 403, and 61 l(a), and Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 1. Id. at 1578 & n.10.
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... A... right of access to the courts is implicit in the Constitu-
tion of the United States and is essential to a free society.
... [C]rowded dockets and overly expensive litigation can still
effectively deny citizens their crucial right of access to the courts.
72
Judge Bertelsman also pointed out the salutary effect of time limits.
He noted that a case tried under the hourglass "ends up being presented
more efficiently and intelligibly" and that when "[p]roperly streamlined,
the case is more effective for the ascertainment of truth, as mandated by
Fed. R. Evid. 611 (a)." 73 Despite his exuberance, Judge Bertelsman cau-
tioned that "the court must analyze each case carefully to assure that
time limits set are not arbitrary.
'74
Other decisions have noted Judge Bertelsman's warning, but have
not always heeded it. In prior decisions-MCI and Reaves--courts vali-
dated time limits but acknowledged that such limits should be "flexible,"
"realistic and fair," and "not absolute or unduly restrictive," or "arbi-
trary. '75 In Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co. ,76 a personal injury action de-
cided before Reaves, but after MCI, the Seventh Circuit first directly
disapproved of rigid time limits. The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that
crowded dockets require federal district judges to strictly control the
length of trials, including setting reasonable deadlines in advance. 77
72. Reaves, 636 F. Supp. at 1578, 1579 (emphasis added) (footnotes and citation omitted).
Reaves's emphasis on the public's interest in expeditiously resolving civil disputes was reiter-
ated in two recent time limit cases. See United States v. Hardage, 750 F. Supp. 1460, 1528
(W.D. Okla. 1990); Harris v. Marsh, 679 F. Supp. 1204, 1236 (E.D.N.C. 1987).
73. Reaves, 636 F. Supp. at 1580. Judge Bertelsman generally agreed with Judge Leval
that imposing trial time limits renders
[c]onsiderable benefits--primarily five: It requires counsel to exercise a discipline of
economy choosing between what is important and what is less so. It reduces the
incidence of the judge interfering in strategic decisions. It gives a cleaner, crisper,
better-tried case. It gives a much lower cost to the clients. Finally, it will save
months of our lives.
Id. at 1580 (citing Leval, supra note 4, at 7-8).
Specifically, because Judge Bertelsman issued his opinion after the case had been tried, he
had the rare luxury of reporting on his order's effect. Continuing his criticism of the govern-
ment, Judge Bertelsman observed:
The order worked well in practice. Actually, it was more than generous, the prose-
cution's case still being overlong. It was refreshing to see ... how things started to
move along as the prosecution's time began to run out. Suddenly, the prosecutors
quickly reached the point with each witness and stuck to the issues, thus eliminating
many objections, and the case became intelligible and interesting.
Id. at 1577.
74. Id. at 1580.
75. MCI Communications v. American Tel. & Tel., 708 F.2d 1081, 1171-72 (7th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983); United States v. Reaves, 636 F. Supp. 1575, 1580
(E.D. Ky. 1986).
76. 733 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1984).
77. Id. at 473.
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However, after citing MCI with approval, the Seventh Circuit, per Judge
Posner, emphasized that it
disapprove[d] of the practice of placing rigid hour limits on a trial.
The effect is to engender an unhealthy preoccupation with the clock,
evidenced in this case by the extended discussion between counsel and
the district judge at the outset of the trial over the precise method of
time-keeping-a method that made the computation of time almost as
complicated as in a professional football game.78
Despite its objection, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's
judgment, finding that the lower court acted within its discretion in re-
quiring plaintiffs to present their case within eighteen hours.79 The cir-
cuit court ruled that plaintiffs had been allotted sufficient time, given
both the case's complexity and plaintiffs' failure to demonstrate prejudice
caused by the time limit-such as the exclusion of additional evidence
they would have presented if time allowed.80
B. Recent Cases: A Suggestion of Caution
In three cases following Flaminio, the courts agreed that time limits
may be imposed provided they were flexible and not arbitrary or unfair. s
In each case, the court rejected a challenge to time limits because the
objecting party had either waived the objection or failed to demonstrate
prejudice.8
2
Thus, in Johnson v. Ashby, 83 the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit found that if the district court had strictly enforced the time
limit, it would have been improper.8 4 However, the Eighth Circuit af-
firmed the lower court's judgment because appellant Johnson failed to
both timely object and to make an offer of proof concerning the evidence
that he would have introduced but for the time limits.8 5 The circuit
court also refused to absolve Johnson for his failure to object, concluding
that the time limits did not constitute plain error.86 Similarly, in United
States v. Freel,8 7 District Judge Gordon rejected a criminal defendant's




81. See Johnson v. Ashby, 808 F.2d 676 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v. Freel, 681 F.
Supp. 766 (M.D. Fla. 1988), aff'd, 868 F.2d 1274 (1 1th Cir. 1990); McKnight v. General
Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1306 (1991).
82. Johnson, 808 F.2d. at 678-79; Freel, 681 F. Supp. at 769; McKnight, 908 F.2d at 115.
83. 808 F.2d 676 (8th Cir. 1987).
84. Id. at 678.
85. Id. at 678-79.
86. Id.
87. 681 F. Supp. 766 (M.D. Fla. 1988), aff'd, 868 F.2d 1274 (11th Cir. 1990).
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rights.8 8 The judge concluded that the time limits were "not rigid," that
counsel knew they could receive an extension if they showed good cause,
and that, as in Johnson, defendant Freel failed to timely object, show that
favorable evidence was excluded, or demonstrate plain error.8 9 In Mc-
Knight v. General Motors Corp.,9° the Seventh Circuit affirmed a judg-
ment for plaintiff McKnight in his civil rights and Title VII action.
Disapproving of the district court's "hourglass method" of limiting the
length of trial, and finding unseemly the spectacle of witnesses running to
and from the stand, Judge Posner noted that "to impose arbitrary limita-
tions, enforce them inflexibly and by these means turn a federal trial into
a relay race is to sacrifice too much of one good-accuracy of factual
determination-to obtain another-minimization of the time and ex-
pense of litigation." 91 However, because General Motors failed to pre-
serve its objection and show the time limits caused prejudice, the Seventh
Circuit found the error harmless and affirmed the lower court's
judgment.
92
Recently, the First Circuit became the first court of appeal to find
plain error in a lower court's decision to limit trial time. In Secretary of
Labor v. DeSisto,93 the district court in a Fair Labor Standards Act trial
limited the witnesses to the Department of Labor compliance officer who
had investigated the case and two additional witnesses, one for each
side.94 After a one-day trial, the court awarded plaintiff Secretary a sub-
stantial money judgment.95 On appeal, the First Circuit found the evi-
dence insufficient to support the judgment and that neither party had
objected to the one-witness limitation. 96 The court of appeal concluded
that the insufficient evidence resulted from the witness limitation and
tainted the proceeding. 97 Consequently, the First Circuit felt compelled
to review the trial court's discretion in controlling the presentation of
evidence. 98 The circuit court acknowledged that a district court has sub-
stantial discretion to control its proceedings and, under Federal Rule of
Evidence 403, has the power to exclude cumulative evidence. 99 Further-
88. Id. at 769.
89. Id.
90. 908 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1306 (1991).
91. Id. at 115.
92. Id
93. 929 F.2d 789 (1st Cir. 1991).
94. Id. at 794.
95. Id. at 790.
96. Id. at 794 & n.3.
97. Id. at 795-96.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 794-95.
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more, the First Circuit acknowledged that trial courts may impose rea-
sonable time limits to reduce crowded dockets. 1°°
However, the DeSisto court reiterated the prohibition against ex-
cluding witnesses based on mere numbers, 10' and cited Rule 403's re-
quirement that the negative consequences of evidence must substantially
outweigh its probative value before evidence is excluded. 10 2 The First
Circuit concluded that the district court erred because it had not per-
formed Rule 403's balancing test before imposing the three-witness limit,
nor could it have, since the district court's ruling occurred before the
parties had submitted their witness lists.1o3 Accordingly, the First Cir-
cuit found that the witness limitation was "an apparently arbitrary limi-
tation imposed in the interest of conserving judicial resources," 1 4 and
"constituted an abuse of discretion in that it prevented both parties from
presenting sufficient evidence on which to base a reliable judgment."'
0 5
Thus, the First Circuit ordered a new trial.' °6
III. The Due Process Limitation
As discussed in Section II, courts and commentators overwhelm-
ingly believe that trial time limits benefit litigants, juries, and the public.
With the exception of DeSisto, courts have universally approved limita-
tions on trial time. When properly applied, time limits undoubtedly pro-
vide substantial benefits. However, improperly-imposed trial time limits
may undermine the due process rights of the parties for whom they are
designed to benefit and protect. 0 7
100. Id. at 795.
101. Id. (quoting Padovani v. Buchhausen, 293 F.2d 546, 550 (2d Cir. 1961)).
102. Id. at 796.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 795.
105. Id. at 796.
106. Id.
107. The Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]o person shall be... deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law ...... U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fourteenth
Amendment makes the due process clause binding on the states by providing that "nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .
U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
It may be argued that improperly-imposed trial time limits constitute an abuse of discre-
tion under the statutory and inherent authority to limit the presentation of evidence, but do
not necessarily violate due process. Clearly, trial time limits that violate due process also
constitute an abuse of the court's discretion to impose them. Moreover, when a trial judge
abuses his or her statutory and inherent discretion by so limiting trial time that it prevents a
litigant from presenting and proving its case, such limitation infringes on due process rights.
Thus, in evaluating trial time limits, no meaningful distinction appears to exist between an
abuse of discretion and a due process violation.
In addition, recognizing the issue as one of due process highlights two other concerns
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The Due Process Clause guarantees a fundamentally fair judicial
proceeding. 10 8 This guarantee of fairness makes two promises: one to
the litigant whose case has reached the court for trial; and another to the
public, who has a right to and need for confidence in the judicial system.
The private right to due process requires that a litigant have an op-
portunity to be heard. 10 9 This includes a hearing before a fair and neu-
tral tribunal, 110 so that the litigant can protect liberty and property,"'
and a meaningful opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine wit-
nesses. 112 Although not basing their analysis on due process, the two
circuit courts most recently addressing the propriety of time and witness
limitations have defined a fair hearing as one which strives for "accuracy
of factual determination" ' 1 3 and allows the parties to present "sufficient
evidence on which to base a reliable judgment." ' 1 4 In other words, due
process to the litigant means a trial that seeks to ascertain the truth. This
goal is consistent with both the express terms of Federal Rules of Evi-
dence 102 and 611(a) and the Supreme Court decisions discussing the
trial courts' broad discretion to regulate their own proceedings. 1 5 Thus,
to the litigant, a trial that satisfies due process by seeking to ascertain the
truth will also lead to a reliable judgment. 116
which are not readily apparent under an abuse of discretion analysis. First, beyond the harm
suffered by the litigant, improper trial time limits may adversely affect the public aspect of due
process. See infra notes 117-21 and accompanying text. Second, characterizing the problem as
an abuse of discretion is at odds with the heightened standard of review that should govern
appellate review of trial time limits. See infra notes 152-54 and accompanying text. Thus,
although courts may exercise their discretion to limit trial time, they must also consider due
process issues before imposing the limitation.
108. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136
(1955); JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 13.8, at 528
(4th Ed. 1991).
109. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394
(1914).
110. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980); Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136.
111. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259-60 (1978); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 237
(1940).
112. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 610
(1967).
113. McKnight v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 104, 115 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 1306 (1991).
114. Secretary of Labor v. DeSisto, 929 F.2d 789, 796 (7th Cir. 1991).
115. See supra notes 21-29 and accompanying text.
116. Professor Tribe has referred to the desire for accurate decision-making and reliable
judgments as an instrumental approach to due process. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10-7, at 666-67 (2d ed. 1988). Contrasting this instrumental view
with what he characterizes as an intrinsic approach, Tribe postulates that the
more instrumental approach views the requirements of due process as constitution-
ally identified and valued less for their intrinsic character than for their anticipated
consequences as means of assuring that the society's agreed-upon rules of conduct
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Safeguarding a litigant's right to a reliable judgment is inextricably
related to the public aspect of due process. The public aspect originates
with the litigant and derives from the litigant's feeling that he or she has
received a fair hearing.' 17 Justice Frankfurter noted an interrelation be-
tween the litigant's, and, ultimately, the public's perception that the judi-
cial system has functioned fairly:
The validity and moral authority of a conclusion largely depend on the
mode by which it has been reached .... No better instrument has
been devised for arriving at truth than to give a person in jeopardy of
serious loss notice of the case against him and an opportunity to meet
it. Nor has a better way been found for generating the feeling, so im-
portant to a popular government, that justice has been done." 18
The Supreme Court has explicitly linked the litigant's right to a proceed-
ing which produces a reliable judgment with the public aspect of due
process. In Morgan v. United States,' 19 the Court reviewed a quasi-judi-
cial administrative proceeding and stated that "the rudimentary require-
ments of fair play ... demand 'a fair and open hearing'--essential alike
to the legal validity of the [proceeding] and to the maintenance of public
confidence in the value and soundness of this important government pro-
... are in fact accurately and consistently followed .... From this "instrumental"
perspective, due process is such process as may be required to minimize "substan-
tially unfair . . .deprivations" of the entitlements conferred by law upon private
individuals or groups .... [I]ts point is less to assure participation than to use partici-
pation to assure accuracy.
Id. (emphasis in original) (citations and footnotes omitted).
117. As noted, Professor Tribe characterized this aspect of an individual's due process
rights as an intrinsic view of procedural due process. Id. at 666. According to Tribe:
[T]here is intrinsic value in the due process right to be heard, since it grants to the
individual or groups against whom government decisions operate the chance to par-
ticipate in the processes by which those decisions are made, an opportunity that ex-
presses their dignity as persons .... Whatever its outcome, such a hearing represents
a valued human interaction in which the affected person experiences at least the satis-
faction of participating in the decision that vitally concerns her, and perhaps the
separate satisfaction of receiving an explanation of why the decision is being made in
a certain way. Both the right to be heard from, and the right to be told why, are
analytically distinct from the right to secure a different outcome ... At stake here is
not just the much-acclaimed appearance of justice but, from a.perspective that treats
process as intrinsically significant, the very essence of justice.
Id. (emphasis in original) (citations and footnotes omitted); see Stephen N. Subrin and A.
Richard Dykstra, Notice and the Right to be Heard: The Significance of Old Friends, 9 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 449, 451-58 (1974).
118. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171-72 (1951) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring).
119. 304 U.S. 1 (1938).
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cess."' 120 Thus, the public aspect of due process carries ramifications far
beyond the just outcome of an individual case. 21
Unreasonable trial time limits may violate due process. Therefore,
before limiting trial time, courts must weigh private due process rights
and public due process concerns against the interests of the litigants,
jury, and public. For each benefit that trial time limits may bestow, a
risk exists that due process rights and interests may be violated or
undermined.
As to the litigants, reasonable time limits may force them to stream-
line the evidence presented in their case. This judicially-imposed clarity
may benefit litigants by causing them to persuade the factfinder. Unrea-
sonable trial time limits, however, may prevent a litigant from presenting
sufficient evidence to support a reliable judgment. Overly ambitious time
limits may so restrict the evidence presented that a litigant cannot estab-
lish a prima facie case or defense, let alone a persuasive theory of the
case. For example, setting a short time limit, e.g., a week, in a civil rights
case may impair a plaintiff's ability to establish a pattern and practice of
constitutional violations and thereby prevent the plaintiff from present-
ing sufficient evidence to prove its case. As a result, the time limit would
impair the jury's ability to return a reliable verdict. Such time limits
would violate the litigant's private due process rights.
Time limits may also interfere with the public aspect of the litigant's
due process rights. Unreasonable time limits may cause litigants to per-
ceive that they did not receive a full and fair hearing. As the trial moves
from a decorous and deliberative process toward a "Beat the Clock"
game show atmosphere with witnesses running to and from the stand (as
occurred in McKnight), the litigant will believe that efficiency has tri-
umphed over substance. Thus, irrespective of the result, the litigant will
perceive that justice has not been served. If judges increasingly impose
unreasonable time limits, each litigant's individual sense of frustration
will become systemic.
As to the jury, reasonable time limits may cause the parties to focus
and better organize their evidence to enhance juror comprehension and
thereby promote the "ascertainment of truth." In addition, reasonable
time limits decrease the time citizens must spend as jurors and may in-
120. Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
121. Certainly, litigants have standing to assert that arbitary or unreasonable trial time
limits have violated their due process rights. It is less clear, however, that a member of the
public would have a comparable right to bring suit claiming that trial time limits have under-
mined public confidence in the civil justice system. Accordingly, and notwithstanding the
importance of the public aspect of due process, this Article refers to private due process rights
and public due process concerns or interests.
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crease jurors' respect for and willingness to participate in the trial pro-
cess. But, time limits that unduly exclude evidence will not give jurors
sufficient evidence to determine the facts. Unreasonable time limits may
promote confusion and speculation rather than clarity, and, ultimately,
may lead to unreliable judgments. Like the litigants, jurors may lose
confidence in a system that deteriorates to the point where juries become
the "studio audience" in the litigants' race against the clock. This ero-
sion of confidence would surely increase when jurors attempt to deliber-
ate over an insufficient evidentiary record resulting from unreasonable
time limits.
Finally, as to the public, reasonable trial time limits may promote
efficient and economical use of judicial resources and protect other liti-
gants' right of access to the courts. Reasonably imposed time limits may
allow courts to resolve more cases in a shorter period of time. Unreason-
able time limits, however, will erode public access to the judicial system
if they require appellate review and re-trial. This will lengthen, rather
than shorten, the waiting period for other litigants bringing cases to trial.
More importantly, although trial time limits have not yet been widely
imposed, their unreasonable imposition over time may erode the public
confidence they are designed to engender. Efficiency and access will be
meaningless if time limits so curtail the presentation of evidence that
judgments become unreliable and cause the public, litigants, and jurors
to lose confidence in a civil justice system characterized more by haste
and expediency, than by decorum and deliberation. 22
IV. Guidelines Safeguarding Due Process Rights and Interests
To efficiently administer justice and guarantee due process, courts
must establish guidelines for imposing trial time limits. These guidelines
must ensure trial time limits are "flexible," "realistic and fair," and not
"absolute or unduly restrictive."'123 They must also safeguard the liti-
gants' private due process rights and the public's right to confidence in
the judicial system. This Article, therefore, proposes guidelines for trial
judges imposing trial time limits and appellate courts reviewing such
decisions.
First, to establish a "realistic and fair" trial time limit, a trial judge
must possess sufficient knowledge about the claims and issues in the case
122. Although calling for adaptation "to changing notions about time," one proponent of
trial time limits has cautioned that "[t]here is a need for a delicate balance. Enforced haste
could destroy the decorum and deliberation essential for public acceptance of the jury's verdict
as valid .... " Kirst, supra note 2, at 337.
123. See supra notes 32-106 and accompanying text.
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and "adequate information regarding the nature and extent of the pro-
posed evidence." 124 Before setting time limits, trial judges must immerse
themselves in the case by becoming involved in the pretrial proceed-
ings.125 This can most readily be accomplished in jurisdictions, like most
federal district courts, that assign a single judge to manage a case from
filing to judgment.126 As a case manager, a district judge should call and
participate in status and pretrial conferences under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 16.127 During these conferences, the judge should familiarize
herself or himself with the nature of the claims, the proposed testimony
and numbers of witnesses, and the documentary evidence to be
presented. 128 Also, the trial judge should require the parties to file pre-
trial statements.' 29 In these statements, counsel should be required to
estimate the length of the proponent's case and the entire trial, including
124. MOORE, supra note 19, § 21.643, at 114.
125. Lacey, supra note 5, at 492.
126. See, e.g., N.D. CAL. R. 205-1. In an attempt to eliminate delay, state court's have
increasingly utilized a single assignment system for certain cases. See, e.g., CAL. SUPER. CT.,
SAN FRANCISCO COUNTY R. 2.3(l),(2),(3). Conversely, many states continue to utilize a
master calendar system in which the trial judge is assigned to the case on the day of trial.
Because judges working under a master calendar will have little time to familiarize themselves
with the case, trial time limits imposed in a master calendar system are less likely to satisfy due
process.
127. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a) provides that
the court may in its discretion direct the attorneys for the parties and any unrepre-
sented parties to appear before it for a conference or conferences before trial for such
purposes as (1) expediting the disposition of the action; (2) establishing early and
continuing control so that the case will not be protracted because of lack of manage-
ment ....
128. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c) provides that
[t]he participants at any conference under this rule may consider and take action
with respect to
(3) the possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of documents which will avoid
unnecessary proof, stipulations regarding the authenticity of documents, and advance
rulings from the court on the admissibility of evidence;
(5) the identification of witnesses and documents,
(10) the need for adopting special procedures for managing potentially difficult or
protracted actions that may involve complex issues, multiple parties, difficult legal
questions, or unusual proof problems, and
(11) such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action.
129. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(d) provides that '[a]ny final pretrial conference shall be held as
close to the time of trial as reasonable under the circumstances." As part of that final pretrial
conference, many district judges require each party to file Pretrial Conference Statements dis-
cussing the matters listed in Rule 16(c).
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the amount of time needed for each witness.130 Based on this informa-
tion, the judge can set a reasonable time limit for the trial. 13
Second, judges should be prepared for counsel to inflate their time
estimates during the pretrial process. 132 Trial lawyers are nothing if not
advocates. They know that a trial judge already disposed to imposing
time limits will be further inclined to pare hours or days from their esti-
mates. Thus, counsel may be prone to exaggeration. Given this likeli-
hood, the trial judge can allocate less time than requested for trial,
provided he or she has considered the complexity of the issues and the
nature of the evidence. However, when a trial judge adopts the parties'
estimates, the time limits imposed should be presumed fair and only sub-
ject to challenge if unforeseen events cause hardship during trial.133
Third, trial judges should impose time limits on all parties.13 4 This
requirement guards against arbitrary or discriminatory imposition in two
respects. Imposing trial limits on all parties prevents the trial judge from
punishing one party for another party's transgressions. For example,
judges should not impose a time limit on the defendant after an "unlim-
ited" plaintiff has taken an inordinate amount of time to present its case.
Bilateral time limits also avoid imposition of time limits on an ad hoc
basis. In SCM v. Xerox, Judge Newman imposed time limits on the
plaintiff during the middle of trial, but neither imposed, nor indicated
that he would impose, time limits on the defendant. 3 5 Judges must im-
pose bilateral time limits to promote evenhanded justice and fundamental
fairness.
Fourth, trial judges should impose time limits before trial, if at all,
and before either party presents evidence.' 36 Establishing time limits
before trial not only prevents inequities and potential discrimination
caused by changing the rules in the middle of trial, 37 but also gives all
130. MOORE, supra note 19, § 21.643, at 114.
131. Id.; Leval, supra note 4, at 8; Schwarzer, supra note 6, at 124.
132. See Leval, supra note 4, at 8.
133. As a matter of symmetry, it may seem appropriate for the trial judge to allocate the
same amount of time to each party. However, given likely differences in issues, proof, and
style of presentation, each party will not necessarily require the same amount of time to pres-
ent its case. Although widely divergent time allotments may raise questions of fairness, a judge
does not have to allot equal amounts of time to the parties in most cases.
134. Lacey, supra note 5, at 492.
135. See supra notes 32-49 and accompanying text.
136. MOORE, supra note 19, § 21.643, at 114 & n.200.
137. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
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parties sufficient opportunity to determine the best use of their time
before presenting their case.
138
Fifth, as Judge Grady did in MCI,139 and to avoid the rigidity disap-
proved of by the Seventh Circuit in Flaminio'4° and McKnight,14' trial
judges should also inform the parties before trial that they will grant
reasonable extensions for good cause. 142 Ideally, the trial judge's initial
time allocation should include a cushion-perhaps ten to fifteen percent
above the actual time estimate-for contingencies that may arise during
trial. 143 By so doing, the trial court may avoid mid-trial requests for
extensions. Also, a cushion avoids unfairness to the party who complied
with the court's initial time limits.' 44 Based on experience with similar
cases and knowledge of the present case, the trial judge may accurately
estimate the amount of time necessary for trial. However, estimating
reasonable time limits is not an exact science. Issues may take on unan-
ticipated significance after a few days of trial, more evidence than antici-
pated may be necessary to prove or rebut a point, or witnesses and
counsel may be unduly hostile or obstructionist. Moreover, even when a
trial proceeds as anticipated, the most informed time estimate may be-
come unreasonable. Thus, the trial judge must be willing to grant exten-
sions to accommodate the necessary expansion of issues and proof,
protect against hostility or delay from witnesses or opposing counsel, and
correct mistaken initial time estimates. 45 Accordingly, and notwith-
standing the legitimate desire to avoid changing the rules mid-trial, trial
judges must be willing to grant reasonable extensions to ensure due
process.
Sixth, the trial judge must develop an equitable method of charging
time against each parties' account. In many instances, the defendant will
prefer to present its case through cross-examination of plaintiff's wit-
nesses. 146 Rather than charging each side for the total time used to pres-
138. MOORE, supra note 19, § 21.643, at 114 n.200.
Limiting the amount of time for rebuttal constitutes an exception to the general rule.
Because the scope of rebuttal largely depends on the scope of the preceding "case," courts
should impose time limits for rebuttal only after each party presents its case-in-chief.
139. 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983).
140. 733 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1984).
141. 908 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1306 (1991).
142. See Leval, supra note 4, at 8; MOORE, supra note 19, § 21.643 at 114-15. But cf
Schwarzer, supra note 6, at 124 (extensions defeat the purpose of time limitations and may be
unfair to the party who conformed to the limit).
143. See Schwarzer, supra note 6, at 124.
144. Id.
145. See Antitrust Commission Report, supra note 2, at 536; Leval, supra note 4, at 8;
MOORE, supra note 19, § 21.643, at 114-15.
146. See Leval, supra note 4, at 7-8.
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ent its case, the judge should charge each party for the time it uses,
regardless of whether the party uses its time on direct or cross-
examination. 1
47
The trial judge must also decide how or whether to charge time
taken to hear and resolve evidentiary objections. One approach-
adopted by Judge Bertelsman in Reaves-would be to deduce the time
spent arguing an overruled objection from the objecting party's time al-
lotment. 48 Although Judge Bertelsman declined to do so, the time spent
arguing a valid objection could be charged to the proponent of the evi-
dence. 149 However, not all evidentiary rulings have a clear-cut winner or
loser and such intricate time-keeping invites the same criticism that
Judge Posner levied in Flaminio. 150 Most objections will take only
seconds of trial time to resolve. Thus, although the party conducting the
examination will lose some of its allocated time, the time spent hearing
most objections should not be charged to any party. On the other hand,
if the trial judge allows lengthy argument on an objection or believes that
counsel has interposed objections to delay, the judge should retain the
discretion to charge the time against the obstructionist party or extend
the time of the non-offending party.' 5'
Seventh, appellate courts must utilize a standard of review for trial
time limits that takes into account the due process rights at stake. Ordi-
narily, a trial judge is entitled to substantial deference in supervising liti-
gation or controlling the presentation of evidence and appellate courts
review a trial judge's decisions on such matters under an abuse of discre-
tion standard. 52 Appellate courts, reviewing time and witness limita-
147. Id.; Schwarzer, supra note 6, at 124. But cf MOORE, supra note 19, § 21.643 at 114-
15 n.202.
The trial judge must also determine the "turn over" point in the trial. If a plaintiff may
suffer prejudice because defendant has tried his or her case on cross-examination, defendant
may be prejudiced if plaintiff refuses to rest. A plaintiff might take advantage of the time limits
by refusing to turn over the case to defendant and instead calling witness after witness, thereby
forcing defendant to exhaust her time on cross-examination. As noted by Judge Leval, the
judge should address the turn over issue at the outset. Upon receiving input from all parties
and after making due allowance for the parties' strategic considerations, the trial judge should
set an outside limit (based on a percentage of plaintiff's time allotment) for when plaintiff must
rest. Leval, supra note 4, at 8. As with the initial time estimates, the turn over point may be
modified upon showing of good cause. Id.
148. United States v. Reaves, 636 F. Supp. 1575, 1581 (E.D. Ky. 1986).
149. See United States v. Hardage, 750 F. Supp. 1460, 1528 (W.D. Okla. 1990).
150. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
151. MOORE, supra note 19, § 21.643, at 114 & n.202.
152. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558 n.l (1988); Donovan v. Burger King Corp.,
672 F.2d 221, 225 (1st Cir. 1982).
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tions, have applied that deferential standard. 153 However, as discussed
above, the propriety of trial time limits is not merely a question of a
court's ability to control its docket, but also a question of due process.
As such, appellate courts should take a "hard look" at a trial judge's
imposition of trial time limits and thereby apply a standard of review
falling somewhere between the deferential abuse of discretion standard
and the non-deferential de novo standard applicable to pure questions of
law. 154
The foregoing guidelines attempt to accommodate the courts' and
society's interests in the efficient administration of justice while paying
greater deference than has previously been paid to the litigants' and pub-
lic's due process rights and interests. Adoption of these or similar guide-
lines will give practical meaning to concepts of fairness and will promote
and protect due process values.
Conclusion
As case managers armed with the hourglass, trial judges will un-
doubtedly continue to impose time limits on civil trials, Their authority
to do so appears unassailable, and few can quarrel with a procedural
innovation that promises so much to so many. However, like many pro-
cedures that champion efficiency, trial time limits may hinder, rather
than promote, the ascertainment of truth. In so doing, they may violate
private due process rights and undermine public due process interests.
Trial judges must consider these due process rights and interests when
establishing time limits and courts must develop guidelines to safeguard
them. Although time limits may flourish, they must not be allowed to
denigrate the litigants', and ultimately the public's, right to a fair trial.
153. Secretary of Labor v. DeSisto, 929 F.2d 789, 795 (1st Cir. 1991); MCI Communica-
tions v. American Tel. & Tel., 708 F.2d 1081, 1171 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891
(1983).
154. See White v. Estelle, 669 F.2d 973, 975-76 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Austin,
933 F.2d 833, 841-41 (10th Cir. 1991); see also United States. v. Pardue, 765 F. Supp. 513, 531
& n.6 (W.D. Ark. 1991). To preserve the issue on appeal, the party objecting to the trial time
limits should ordinarily timely object or be deemed to have waived the objection. See Mc-
Knight v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 104, 115 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
1306 (1991); Johnson v. Ashby, 808 F.2d 676, 678-79 (8th Cir. 1987). However, given the due
process rights involved, a party need not object in every instance. See DeSisto, 929 F.2d at 794
& n.3. If the trial judge fails to immerse himself or herself in the case before imposing time
limits or fails to follow the above guidelines to the appellant's prejudice, a party may raise the
due process challenge on appeal even though it failed to object during the trial.
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